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    Based on recent field research, the paper suggests an interpretative model of territorial 
government in France. Relations between national and local authorities as well as policy- 
making processes suggest that the centralized State has faced a major decline of its hegemony 
and that decentralization reforms have induced a polycentric dynamics. Seven basic 
characteristics and three key properties of the model are discussed. The emerging model fits 
neither a new localism nor a new centralism pattern. It is the product of on-going incremental 
trade-offs between centrifugal and centripetal rationales. This complexity reflects a situation 
that is under the rather conservative and tight control of national politicians holding multiple 
local elected mandates.                                                                        
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Up to the late 1970s France had been considered as a quasi-ideal case of 
centralized state (De Tocqueville 1856). The authoritarian and rather unexpected 
decentralization policy launched in 1981 by François Mitterrand, the newly 
elected President of the Republic, raised enthusiasm and attracted international 
attention (Hayward 1983, Page and Goldsmith 1987, Schmidt 1990). During the 
following twenty years additional modernization decisions were taken by ruling 
politicians and central ministries. End of July 2004 the conservative majority at 
the Parliament approved a new and relevant transfer of policy domains from the 
State to the regions, the départements and the communes.  
 
Have reforms fundamentally changed it all? How far has the State role and 
influence been reduced or transformed? How far have local and regional 
authorities taken advantage of massive transfers? The purpose shall be to 
understand the current state of territorial government, its basic characteristics 
and dynamics, to identify the actual functioning of the vertical relationships 
between national and sub-national levels as well as to understand how public 
authorities and organizations belonging to the same institutional and territorial 
level manage horizontal interdependencies. It is neither to list the 
decentralization reforms and describe their formal content nor to explain why 
France has become so active modernizing its way to govern sub-national public 
affairs - since the 1950s around four hundred and twenty decrees have been 
issued by Paris to modernize administrative procedures.   
 
The debate between new localism and new centralism that goes on in a number 
of European countries may seem quite irrelevant for the understanding of the 
current French situation. Territorial policy making and politics are basically run 
and regulated by a polycentric and informal configuration involving national 
ministries and sub-national authorities so that none of them plays a leading role 
and may act in a fully autonomous way. Intricate interdependencies and 
complex exchanges provide a normative tissue and a political fabric in which the 
various parties are embedded, which access is not easy to outsiders and that is 
non transparent for citizens. 
 
Social science research had identified informal characteristics such as cooptation 
processes between State agencies and local notables (Grémion 1976) or the 
emergence of cities as strong political entities (Thoenig 1987). They operated at 
the margins of the centralized State design well before the 1981 decentralization.  
They still exist in the early 2000s, but in a global setting where the hegemony of 
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ministries in Paris and prefects in the provinces  belongs to the past and the pure 
centralized model has vanished.  
 
Research has also evidenced that less government and more governance 
approaches handle regional and local public affairs (Le Galès and Lequesne 
1998). Policy networks, issue communities, urban regimes, and subsidiarity are 
usually associated with governance. Nevertheless government from below 
practices (Sellers 2002) do not imply a full withdrawal of the State, and 
participative policy making does not imply that the political class loses control. 
The State apparatus still matters. The innovation is that it is just one player 
among many others.   Sub-national bodies enjoy much autonomy but they do not 
act in a autarkic manner.  
 
French decentralization and modernization processes have stopped half way 
between centralization and disjointed pluralism models. A system is operating 
which is more than just a compromise. The aim of the paper is to characterize its 
components and its inner regulation. It is also to explain the roots of its 
sustainability and legitimacy. 
 
French decentralization and territorial administration coincides with the triumph 
of the elected politicians over the State executive branch (including the 
government and the national bureaucrats such as the prefects). Multiple political 
office holders control the reform agenda in a rather conservative and selfish 
perspective. Often described as a half reform because transfer of power from the 
State to territorial institutions did not include transfer of power from the local 
political class to citizens and inhabitants, the 1981 decentralization policy 
enhanced the role of such grands élus. Its sponsors and socialist thinkers such as 
François Mitterrand, Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy and Gaston Defferre, his 
minister if Interior, were seasoned notables and multiple office holders. They 
framed a decentralization scheme that would strengthen the power base of their 
colleagues across the country and among the various political parties. 
 
The interpretative model presented below relies mainly on observations and 
information collected during a series of six empirical field studies led between 
1991 and 2002. Their respective topic and methods shall be listed whenever 
mentioned. Other sources and recent studies shall also be used and cited that 
cover additional facets. 
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SEVEN BASIC CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Neither hierarchical authority nor bargaining between fully autonomous equals 
structure the way the national State and sub-national public authorities manage 
their actual interdependence and exchange relationships in France.  
 
A quite old tradition exists that ranks the French case as being rather unique and 
complex (Ashford, 1982). To a large degree the idea that it is some exception 
while inter-governmental would be easier to understand in most other 
democracies is not convincing. Part of the prejudice may derive from the quite 
early emphasis made by social scientists on informal processes and actual 
practices.  Reforms  designed and implemented in the last two decades have not 
made the situation more simple, to say the least. 
 
Territorial policy-making and politics suggest in a recurrent manner the 
existence and the importance Seven basic characteristics structure the way 
territorial affairs are handled and the social structure in which public officials 
are embedded. They blend functional creativity and democratic conservatism, 
competition mechanisms and cooperation norms, institutional innovativeness 
and power struggles.  
 
   
A dense and thick institutional web 
 
Sub-national affairs are handled by an exceptionally high number of political 
public authorities that have different legal statuses and operate at different 
geographic levels.  
 
France is vertically sub-divided in four main levels: communes, inter-
communalities, départements, and regions. About 54.000 sub-national public 
authorities govern some jurisdiction dealing with public affairs, which means 
one for slightly more than one hundred inhabitants. The institutional density is 
spectacular. The number of communes, for instance, is approximately equivalent 
to the sum of the communes in all the other country members of the European 
Union (see appendix 1) 
 
Not many countries experience such a dense, creative and diverse institutional 
landscape.  The contrast is striking with the often under-estimated importance 
given to local government as compared with national affairs. The conventional 
metaphor that France is made of two parts, Paris and the provinces, is 
questionable. The periphery has been deprived from institutional means of self-
government. Increasing privatization of urban services and public utilities has 
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occurred (Lorrain and Stoker 1997). Nevertheless the rise of market economy 
has not induced much outsourcing or privatization, and has not weakened public 
institutions. About 20 specific statuses exist: municipal councils, general 
councils for départements, regional councils, agglomeration councils, commune 
councils, inter-municipal syndicates, urban communities, pays, etc. Each has 
policy domains to handle and a territory to cover.  
 
At one end of the spectrum are classic democratic jurisdictions such as the 
commune, the département and the region. Citizens elect their office holders. 
These bodies have their own administration and raise fiscal revenues. At the 
other end, ad hoc configurations exist which raison d’être is to administer a 
functional task – collection of garbage, economic development, etc. They are 
governed by so-called indirect democratic principles. Participation to them is 
optional, depending from the discretionary will of local and regional councils. 
Their ruling bodies are composed of officials designated by such councils. Many 
of them can be terminated at any time. A variety of hybrid organs are also 
operating, some being mandatory for the communes being part of their territory, 
others not, some being designed by law, others not.  
 
Functional redundancies and geographical overlaps exist. In extreme cases up to 
nine sub-national public authorities handle local development policies in the 
same commune. Piling up direct and indirect democracy, generalist and 
functional authorities, designs sophisticated webs of actors and jurisdictions. 
Despite values such as equality, uniformity across the territory of the Republic is 
not achieved, quite the opposite.  
 
 
State agencies as local operators 
 
Despite decentralization central state keeps the monopoly of designing and 
changing the status of public sub-national institutions. Organic changes are top 
down driven. For instance the ways to select, train and pay employees of local 
authorities, whether city managers or street cleaners, are defined by national 
laws. The ministry of Interior is in charge of designing standard formal charts 
communes should enforce for their public agencies.  
 
Central institutions are major daily operators handling local policies, as if no 
clear-cut separation would exist between the sphere of local affairs the state has 
in charge and the sphere of local affairs sub-national authorities have in charge. 
Most national ministries operate at the grass roots level. They cover domains 
such as education, agricultural development, crime and law, public health, 
sports,  roads, just to mention a few. 95 % of the state employees work outside 
Paris, in other locations than those of national headquarters. Such a ratio is 
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unique within the OECD and EU member states. Many thousands of field 
agencies are spread across France. For instance the ministry of Finance heads 
five separate administrative networks. Each has specific units at three levels: 
regional, départemental, local. State employees located sub-nationally 
outnumber sub-national authority employees by 40 %. In some domains, they 
even deliver additional services and are not linked to national policies. For 
instance they collect taxes on behalf of local authorities. Local authorities pay a 
fee in return. In some domains, non-mandatory services get supplied in a 
market-type of approach. In engineering, national state ministries like 
Agriculture and Équipement compete with local authority controlled technical 
agencies and with private sector companies.      
 
Inside the state apparatus partitioning is general practice, whether hierarchically 
or horizontally. Tasks are subdivided between specialized silos. Each state field 
agency handles in a monopolistic way a geographical area. It also tends to 
protect its turf from any interference by other state colleagues. This pattern 
induces a dilution of horizontal cooperation between state agencies. The unitary 
French state looks like a loosely coupled network. Even the prefect, supposed to 
be the ultimate incarnation of the state authority and the carrier of general 
interest in each region and département, hardly can coordinate.  
 
 
Competition between public authorities 
 
Perfect centralization defines a world in which order and action are governed 
from the top. Who does what when how and with whom is non ambiguous. The 
French scene suggests that this is not exactly what happens. Asymmetries are 
often relaxed. Transitivities are exceptions.   
 
Neither the regional council nor the general council have some sort of 
constitutional right on the chart of lower level bodies such as communes. 
Regions, départements and communes are separate independent entities not 
linked by subordination principles. No one is entitled to supervise and to act as a 
trustee for anybody else.  
 
Regions, communes and départements may be called generalists. Core 
competences are legally assigned to each of them. But the actual division of 
domains is far more informal and subtle. Tasks that are mandatory for 
communes may be delegated to other levels such as syndicates of communes 
(waste disposal, busing, etc) or are sub-contracted to private companies (water 
management, cemeteries, public transportation, etc). More important, a public 
authority may take the initiative to enter a policy area that is not part of its own 
core portfolio but belongs to the core domain of another territorial level. Three, 
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four when not five different authorities belonging to different levels fund and 
provide goods or services for the same territory. Even state field agencies join 
the game and add complexity. Here they set up a joint policy with a city. There 
they provide services that overlap or are redundant with services produced by 
the same city.  
 
Local authorities take advantage of such legal relaxations. They define their own 
agenda of issues and portfolio of domains. To intervene or not in such and such 
sector becomes a strategic tool for political purposes. Even with few monies 
allocated to a domain, the council may show to the population that it cares about 
it. The initiative to cover a wide array of projects may satisfy tactic purposes and 
symbolic uses:  hindering the intervention of potential competitors, putting 
pressure on third parties to spend their own money in a domain the latter would 
not have covered spontaneously, increasing the brand awareness of the council 
and the image of its political leaders.   
 
Public affairs structure an open market where players might compete to expand 
their visibility or to control a dominant market share. The formal division of 
core domains between players does not regulate most of their acts and non-acts, 
even in domains like law and crime where precise limits give exclusive 
ownership to state police. Local authorities sign exchange and cooperation 
agreements with foreign countries. Politically fashionable issues like sustainable 
development attract attention from several public authorities while others such 
as drug addictions remain neglected, kept to the lowest required standards. Some 
institutions or levels still matter more than others. But cards keep being 
redistributed among the players. The division of work and the modes of 
exchange are diversified across the national territory. Sub-national government 
is driven by micro-contexts and multiple players who co-produce informal and 
flexible designs. 
 
A complex set of inter-institutional patterns 
  
Another stylized fact deals with autonomy and coordination. Quite extensive use 
is made of cooperation patterns, but within certain limits.  
 
Coordination as an administrative mechanism by which the center makes the 
parts compatible does not work well. Policies requiring the intervention of 
various field agencies inside a same jurisdiction are a nightmare to coordinate 
and to manage. Each ministry tends to keep its own professional culture and to 
protect its own networks with local public authorities and elites.   
 
Between sub-national public authorities, the picture looks quite identical. While 
massive differences exist between authorities of the same territorial level – for 
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instance between rural and urban communes - in terms of population size, 
financial resources or functional needs, local councils are fiercely fighting to 
remain the sole legitimate and democratically appointed masters of their 
jurisdictions. Communes or regions are inclined to prefer mutual avoidance. 
Mergers giving birth to large size jurisdictions are considered as the ultimate 
threat, as a way to commit political suicide. Functional coordination achieved 
through various institutional arrangements such as communes of communes is 
widely practiced because it provides alternative routes to survival. 
 
Hierarchy and polity are weak mechanisms.  Nevertheless many joint ventures 
and alliances occur. Functional interests and ad hoc circumstances more than 
partisan politics push autonomous bodies to become limited partners.   
 
Extensive use has been made of quasi-contractual partnerships and opportunistic 
joint ventures since the late 1980s. Co-funding provides an illustration state of 
territorial government. A research made about budgetary processes in two 
regional councils (Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Limousin) indicates that about two thirds 
of the budgets controlled by regional councils are spent for co-developed 
programs and allocated to co-funded projects (Gilbert and Thoenig 1997 and 
1999b). In the 1990s, a region co-funded an annual average of more or less 
1.300 single investment projects. 
 
Strong incentives and procedural requirements exist which are set up by outside 
authorities such as the European Commission or the French government. Two 
major formal set-ups for public investment funding are European Structural 
Funds and so-called Plan Contracts between the State and the Regions (Gilbert 
and Thoenig 1999a).  To be eligible for such multi-annual subsidies, sub-
national authorities have to match funds allocated.  Projects are jointly prepared, 
decided and assessed. Facts show a wide use of co-funding. About half of the 
budget spent by a regional council is allocated to a co-funded project. 
Mutualisation practices go far beyond formal set-ups. About one quarter of local 
projects are funded on a spot ad hoc and one shot basis.  Here five partners (a 
village, the département, the national ministry of Agriculture, the local Chamber 
of Agriculture, the region) each paying one fifth of the bill, join to buy a one 
thousand and hundred euro forest acquisition. There two parties (a regional 
council and an urban community council) spend sixteen million euros each to 
build a state research center.  
 
Partnerships may be lasting or spot, formalized or verbal. Cases are exceptional 
of tense when not conflicting situations emerging around the definition of the 
financial contribution each single participant party should pledge. Basically 
parties involved trust each other at all steps of the process, from the initial study 
of the project to the payment and the final evaluation, as suggested by direct 
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observation of sessions of two regional councils,  and corroborated by in-depth 
interviews of 42 State or local decision makers involved (Gilbert and Thoenig 
1997 and 1999b). 
 
The success of co-funding practices is amazing. Local authorities pro-actively 
look for issues that could be administered by quasi-contractual partnerships and 
projects that could become co-funded. State ministries play identical strategies. 
They want to find opportunities and ways to keep a role, to serve as partners, to 
increase their legitimacy as good citizens of local democracy. 
   
 
A moderate level of democratic participation  
 
One per cent of the inhabitants holds an elected mandate, mainly in rural 
municipal councils of less than 2000 inhabitants. In large urban communes the 
average percentage does not reach one half per thousand.  France offers two 
opposite facets in terms of democratic participation.  
 
As national surveys consistently show, the mayor of a commune is ranked as the 
political figure French citizens and inhabitants feels the closest to or likes the 
most, far ahead of the President of the Republic, the Prime minister, the member 
of the national Parliament or the regional councilman they elect. Compared with 
the State administration, local authorities are perceived as more efficient and 
responsive. While the commune remains the archetype of localism and old roots, 
the region has become a key element of territorial identity despite the fact that it 
has been established only twenty years ago as a full democratic institution 
(Observatoire Interrégional du Politique 2002).  
 
On the other hand France does not rank among countries experiencing a lively 
local democratic participation (Hoffmann-Martinot 2004). Every sixth year, 
electors show an increasing lack of interest for municipal as well as regional 
elections. They also make more volatile choices in terms of parties and leaders. 
Voting less and in a more opportunistic way does not imply that people 
participate more on other political arenas. France has dragged its feet in the 
participatory revolution. Decentralization from the State to sub-national 
authorities was not followed by decentralization from the political class to the 
citizens. February 27, 2002, the national Parliament voted an institutional 
arrangement to increase direct democracy. The 50 communes with over 80.000 
inhabitants have to create in a mandatory manner district councils open to the 
population, the process being managed under close control by local ruling 
politicians. More relevant set ups such as referenda or councils of citizens 
enjoying real autonomy might exist here and there. Their existence reflects the 
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discretionary initiative of the ruling mayor and has no legal basis ensuring 
continuity.         
 
 
 
Performance constrained actors  
 
Local authorities in general look like typical formal bureaucracies. But this does 
by no mean imply that they function in a bureaucratic way, paralyzed by  
rigidities and poor efficiency.  
 
The départements had been quite unanimously perceived as too small and 
unable to manage modern economic development policies. The creation from 
scratch of regions clearly was considered as the way to provide the adequate 
solutions. Surprisingly, far from remaining terminal authorities, départements 
have recovered strongly since the 1970s. More generally territorial jurisdictions 
have increased their performance ability in a spectacular manner. France had 
been lagging in terms of local infrastructure investments. While the state had 
helped quite much, a major turnaround was nevertheless achieved by the own 
efforts of modernization of the communes, regions and départements. Cities 
have substituted to 19th century administrative clerks well-trained technicians 
and modern managers (Lorrain 1989) 
  
A survey made in 1996 on 266 city managers of communes of 15.000 
inhabitants or more ( a sample of 15 % of the total) clearly suggests that y many 
standards French local public authorities achieve quite acceptable levels of 
efficiency and effectiveness (Thoenig and Burlen 1999a). They have been quite 
good on average at managing macro-financial crisis periods (Guengant 1995). 
They have kept their average annual expenses at a lower level than their 
revenues without salary cuts and lay-offs of staff. Techniques such as 
management control are of wide and professional use. A research made on the 
use of management tools on 487 communes of 12.000 inhabitants suggets that 
about 85% of their city managers combine modern human resource policies and 
analytical accounting techniques (Thoenig 1997). They provide at an acceptable 
cost and within rather balanced budgets rather above average public goods and 
services. Sub-national authorities, once considered as hopeless cases, are today 
perceived as relevant alternatives to central state. Miracles or even solutions, 
once provided by Paris, are expected today from regions and inter-
communalities.  Most regions and some cities have big chunks of money 
available for investment and current expenses that the national budget 
apparently does not any longer have. 
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Many communes or even départements may be too small geographically or too 
weak fiscally to recruit personnel. But the quasi-market structure described 
above provides flexibility – if a council lacks resources, it may most of the time 
find help from partners - and acts as an incentive pressure – citizens can 
compare and benchmark. 
 
Constitutive reforms and incremental changes  
 
Modernization reforms in general occur and get implemented in quite soft ways 
Problems are not addressed which would imply surgery to heal them. Politicians 
favor patience and pragmatism as a virtue.  Incrementalism is considered as a 
wise style for a government to operate. The only exception was the brutal and 
comprehensive manner in which the 1981 decentralization reform was handled.  
 
Old or “empty” institutions are not abolished by the will of the state, top down. 
France remains one of the very few European democracies that has not seen 
since the 1940s its parliament or central government reshape the general map of 
the communes and reduce by law their numbers, despite the fact that about 80 % 
of them host less than 20 % of the total population, each of them having less 
than 2.000 inhabitants. To decentralize to the local political elites the handling 
of major sub-national institutional issues could well imply that the State is 
weaker than expected, at least in territorial politics matters. 
 
Innovation is most of the time generated locally. Paris just ratifies and 
legitimizes new solutions that had been built up here and there. Even before the 
law had been abolished that was forbidding local authorities to allocate grants to 
private firms, many municipalities had started to intervene in economic 
development matters.  Experimentation has been recognized in 2003 by the 
French parliament as a constitutional right of local authorities. Since many years 
experimentations had been practiced sub-nationally. To some extent the state 
has recognized what was going on and given an impulse to widen initiatives.  
 
The more incremental changes are made the more the level of factual autonomy 
of sub-national bodies is increasing. Faced with a specific problem the state 
designs a specific solution. As the result of the piling up by Paris of new 
institutional statuses and bodies devoted to inter-communal cooperation, 
communes, but also départements gain additional zones of discretion. They have 
more opportunities in terms of choosing which ad hoc body to join or not.  
 
Unintended consequences are many. The major winner of decentralization 
policies may well be the département and its general council, considered in the 
1970s as a terminal conservative body, and that plays today a key role in social 
affairs and road infrastructure. Transfers of policy domains from the State to 
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local authorities may not get a unanimous support. The 2002-2004 
decentralization launched by the center-right government under President Chirac 
has induced a majority of indifferent to negative opinions in public opinion. 
Disenchantment is gaining ground among  reform activists and supporters.  
 
 
  
THREE KEY SYSTEMIC PROPERTIES 
 
 
Characteristics such as thickness, overlap, redundancy and competition, just to 
name a few of those underlined above, may appear as obstacles to 
modernization and rationalization.  Their hegemony may imply that within 30 
years, decentralization policies combined with the rise of urban regimes and the 
fiscal crisis of the State have not solved the paralysis of centralization and the 
arrogance of bureaucracies that had been underlined about the pre-1981 
situation, but have increased even more chaos and disruption.  
 
The fact is that chaos is not prevailing. Analysis suggests that some level of 
integration is achieved and that some collective action is possible between the 
various levels and players. Three main social constructs may be identified that 
provide in a latent way social regulation and political integration: hyper-
centralization of power inside local and regional entities, mutual dependence 
between the State and the sub-national authorities, accumulation of electoral 
mandates. They diffuse implicit but widely shared norms policy-makers learn by 
trial and error. They also are pragmatic, action-focused. They make the handling 
of public affairs less volatile, uncertain and complicated to handle.   They 
civilize conflicts and anarchy 
 
 
 Centralization of power at the sub-national level 
 
Sub-national authorities are formally administered according to a parliamentary 
pattern. Inside each commune, département or region, citizens elect the 
members of a council. Acting as a collective body in an identical way than a 
parliament, the council members define policies and supervise implementation. 
Throughout this procedure an equality principle is institutionalized: each person 
has one vote. Decisions and nominations are the consequences of the 
aggregation of a majority of individual preferences. 
 
In daily practice local democracy does not function exactly the way legal 
frameworks define authority and legitimacy. Power dynamics and asymmetric 
relationships emerge which are quite different. Public affairs are governed in a 
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highly centralized manner. One role is by far dominant if not hegemonic: the 
president of the council. 
 
The paradox of local power is quite visible in cities, as suggested by a series of  
case studies on10 rural and 10 urban municipalities -  in-depth interview of their 
40 elected officials and administrative officers – and observation of policy-
making processes in 14 communes of more than 15.000 inhabitants in domains 
like budget, taxation, infrastructure building and urban renewal policies.      
(Thoenig 1995). The mayor is chosen among and elected by the municipal 
council. He chairs its sessions. He also heads the municipal bureau, a political 
body that is responsible for the execution of the wills of the council and 
supervises the city bureaucracy.  To some extent a political majority or group 
delegates to one of its members some specific tasks to handle while keeping 
formal control of his acts and non-acts. In most municipalities evidence 
persistently shows that the mayor, far from being a peer, becomes the boss of his 
colleagues. He makes his supporters dependent from him far more than he 
depends from them. Power inside the municipal polity polarizes around him.  
 
A mayor acts as a structural hole in a network. He provides integration solutions 
when it is missing while needed in action contexts. Municipal centralization 
combines two skills. The president of the council becomes the main when not 
monopolistic linkage between multiple arenas or worlds, and heterogeneous 
logics of action. At the same time he protects the rents he is benefiting from, 
fights the emergence of any direct linkage between them that would occur 
outside his control, and does even increase barriers. Divide and rule, partitioning 
and integrating, fuel the process (see appendix 2).  
 
Four main arenas and logics of action are under the control of the mayor or 
president: administrative agencies, politics and policy-making, relationships 
with the population, foreign affairs. 
  
The mayor fully controls municipal public agencies. He hires and fires the city 
manager (secrétaire general), an administrative officer. Both work very closely 
together. They share a common interest. The city manager relies on his 
exclusive access to the mayor’s office. He therefore keeps under strong 
command a rather large number of staff and missions. The municipality being 
often the main employer of the commune means that a wide electoral basis may 
be available.   Mayoral legitimacy and budgetary control are his key resources to 
establish his hierarchical authority inside the administrative machinery. 
(Thoenig and Burlen 1998a and b). The mayor can rely on the city manager not 
only because he appoints him, but also because the latter provides the mayor 
with a critical resource: the bureaucrats endorse his policy preferences.  While 
other city council members sit on the municipal bureau, with the rank of adjunct 
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mayors, most of the time they have no real influence and are even forbidden 
direct access to the municipal agencies. Many mayors are quite cautious not to 
offer them opportunities or rights (permanent office, signature, etc) that may 
jeopardize his hegemony. De facto he simultaneously acts as the prime minister 
and as a minister for finance, welfare, public works, etc. of the commune. From 
a broader perspective, nobody else in the commune has any capacity to run and 
coordinate the administrative machine.  
 
The mayor also controls the agenda of the municipal council. His wills and 
preferences become those of his political majority. Far from being a 
representative of a party machine, he acts as the head of a broad coalition. In 
principle citizens have to choose among competing lists of candidates for 
council membership. To elect the mayor among its members is the task of the 
council. In fact the candidates for mayorship are publicly known in advance. 
Their name makes a difference for the citizens who vote.  
 
Given the fact that there are no limits to the number of times council members 
can be re-elected, a mayor can run as long as he wants.  He selects the persons 
who shall join his list for the next election. To set up a coalition reflecting the 
main characteristics of the electorate in terms of gender, age, residence or 
geographic/ethnic origins, matters a lot. National partisan politics is more a 
burden than a resource. The first task a new mayor should achieve is to make his 
political career immune from interferences of his own party national and even 
local organization. Facts confirm that in terms of local government the strongest 
party is not the national party but the party of the mayor. A municipal council is 
therefore structured around two different social roles: the mayor, the 
councilmen. The former is the least common denominator of the latter.  
 
A third key domain covers the relationships with the inhabitants. Mayors and 
presidents of councils allocate much attention to them. In some cases quite much 
money is spent to improve their image and to attribute success to some personal 
characteristics of them. In a symmetric way the solution to problems expressed 
by people is perceived as a personal favor, as linked to the influence and 
discretionary will of a single actor: the mayor himself, even when he strictly 
conforms to law and rules or when third parties have the final decision to make.  
 
Caring about such relationships and customizing service to individuals means 
that the mayor expects to get an electoral return back in the future and keeps 
control. The more a request is individualized, the easier the mayor may either 
satisfy it – by giving an instruction to the specific agency which handles it, 
which a basic councilman cannot do – or just give the proof that he has tried the 
best – in case delivery is not feasible. 
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Another outcome of a personalized treatment of demands is structural. Making 
aggregation of single demands quite difficult to occur means that collective 
action is less likely to emerge and that general causes are less likely to find 
advocates.  Fractions inside the municipal council are less able to pick requests 
from the population and use them as partisan politics issues without the consent 
of the mayor.  
 
Foreign affairs are the fourth and perhaps most decisive factor allowing 
centralization to occur and last as legitimate. Many outside public authorities 
manage policy domains that have consequences for the commune, and allocate 
attention or resources that matter for the mayoral entrepreneur. He builds a 
monopole around relationships with key outside institutions. He – and nobody 
else among the council members - spends time remaining in touch and 
negotiating with the general council, the regional council, State agents like the 
prefect, public financial institutions in Paris, the European Commission 
representatives, etc. The portfolio also includes public utility companies and 
firms that are potential job providers or urban developers. The wider his network 
of easy access to extra-municipal decision makers, the more he acts as a 
powerful broker when not as the rain maker inside his commune. He knows in 
advance what initiatives third parties may take, which opportunities are 
available, whom to contact in order to speed up a request or to get some extra 
funding.  
 
Centralization induces long tenures. French mayors are world’s champions in 
terms of longevity in power, despite the fact that recent years have seen some 
higher turnover (Hoffmann-Martinot  2000). On average they remain in power 
for thirteen years. Not to centralize is a way to commit early political suicide. 
 
Centralization induces a major relaxation of checks and balances principles 
(Thoenig 1996). A mayor, a president of the general council or of the regional 
council acts simultaneously as the chief of the executive and the boss of the 
legislative branch for many years in a row. Issues at stake have a low public 
visibility. Some form of patronage may develop.  
 
The polarization of power on one sole person has dramatically expanded from 
communes to départements. The case is even more spectacular at the regional 
level: 10 years only after their creation, 17 out of 21 regional councils were 
already governed by one dominant integrator: their president. Functional 
institutions running according to indirect democracy procedures – their leaders 
are nominated by the councils running the member authorities, not by the 
citizens of their district – should be added to the list. Decentralization from the 
State has helped diffuse and legitimize centralization in sub-national authorities  
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 The State territorial embeddedness: from local cooptation to 
institutionalization of collective action  
 
Cross-regulation and cooptation of local notables were key processes used by 
State bureaucracies to face territorial public affairs in pre-decentralized France 
(Thoenig 1975, Crozier and Thoenig 1976). Observation shows that in the 
current post-centralized system they still are in use, but have lost much of their 
importance.  
 
In the early 2000s as in the early 1970s, State administrative pyramids keep 
functioning in a quite flexible manner. They show much sensitivity to local 
specificities and particularistic requests. They do not apply in a blind and rigid 
ways impersonal criteria. Grass roots agents take much distance with rules and 
headquarters. Inside their ministerial hierarchical pyramid, they even behave as 
advocates of causes and vested interests rooted in the local territory in which 
they are supposed to act as representatives of the state policy and enforce its 
wills. Flexibility in action and endorsement of localism are two basic processes 
that reinforce each other.  
 
State agents invest much time and care building up local relational networks and 
getting support from local elected officials like mayors of communes or 
presidents of councils.  They may even prefer to help the latter get their 
problems solved than control whether their acts and non-acts do conform to the 
legal and financial procedures defined by the State. For a prefect a major failure 
to avoid is to lose access to and confidence from the political elites who are 
located in his geographical jurisdiction. This also implies that the more state 
agencies are embedded in the local territorial jurisdictions, the less their 
headquarters can control them. Hierarchical coordination between bureaucratic 
silos is quite difficult to generate inside the State apparatus while the local 
dominant elected politician becomes, even without any explicit intervention, the 
common reference for each of them.    
 
A major function of cross regulation is to build local political capital. State 
representatives working in field agencies internalize values and stakes that are 
those carried and shared by local groups. These values and stakes may in many 
cases be somewhat different from those emitted by the national headquarter. For 
grass roots agencies local embeddedness is a resource, not a constraint. Their 
agents are perceived by those they administer as human, sensitive, doing the best 
they can. In return State agencies rally local support. For instance the national 
police gets vital information from the public and invaluable support from 
municipalities.  
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Decentralization pushes national bureaucracies to be even more sensitive to 
achieve local political capital. The only problem is that, as compared with the 
old days of centralization, Paris has now many less resources to allocate at a 
time when local notables were substituted by heads of autonomous institutions. 
Cooptation and cross-regulation are insufficient mechanisms for the State 
apparatus to remain a relevant player in territorial affairs.   
 
Within the last 20 years, most legal and financial controls of sub-national 
authority acts were transferred from ministries and prefects to autonomous 
judiciary bodies such as Regional Courts of Accounts. Facing increased 
competition from the firms, State agencies also have lost their quasi-monopoly 
on technical and administrative expertise. Several policy domains linked to 
transportation, social affairs, professional training and economic development 
have been transferred by the State to local authorities. By comparison local 
authorities have increased their resources and their autonomy in a relevant way.  
State public agencies do less by themselves than in the past, distribute less 
money and rely less on technical standards to impose their will. Faced with 
increasing budgetary shortages, Paris decentralizes the leftovers of the Welfare 
State to sub-national authorities. 
 
Secondary analysis of case studies dealing with inter-organizational 
management of policies such as forests, industrial and domestic waste collection 
and treatment , crime and law, regional parks, and urban zoning indicate that a 
major change has occurred. Another model of governance has been endorsed 
and developed by the State: institutionalization of collective action (Duran and 
Thoenig 1996).  
 
Being less able to pay the piper and call the tune, central government develops 
policy tools such as constitutive policies,. Specific arenas are supplied to 
territorial actors to address new issues in a context where traditional 
jurisdictions are too small and rigid to handle mobile problems, multiple public 
and private actors are involved in setting up solutions and implementing them, 
and uncertain technologies are used to handle problems difficult to define. 
Procedures and approaches are set up such as quasi-neighborhood councils and 
public hearings that enable single issue groups and private interests to express 
and share some common definition of specific problems to address. In parallel to 
democratically elected councils, ad hoc policy arenas exist that have a 
consultative role. Powerful and traditional institutions like chambers of 
commerce or agriculture, but also single-issue groups, economic lobbies and 
firms join public agencies and politicians to help identify specific problems and 
their causes, coordinate efforts to address them and elaborate in a quasi-
consensual manner an action-oriented blueprint. Non-profit associations, moral 
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entrepreneurs, citizen groups invest attention and energy Such participation 
schemes, one per policy domain, give birth to a kind of functional or 
administrative democracy. It is more than pure consultation and less than power 
sharing. It remains widely understood that the legitimate political bodies keep 
the final decision and that elected politicians remain in charge.   
 
Touchy local issues like crime and law, for instance, have become co-governed 
and co-produced by such arrangements, as suggested by a field research made in 
three different regions and combining in-depth interviews of 64 State 
representatives (judges, police officers and prefects) and 8 mayors with direct 
observation of coordination meetings and the conduct of  police interventions in 
real time. (Gatto and Thoenig 1993). Transportation (Purenne 2003), economic 
development (Douillet 2001), public housing among other domains illustrate 
how common such a phenomenon has become. Even policy domains that were 
pure monopolies of the State - such as R and D or higher education – have 
become extremely sensitive to the emergence of specific regional wills and 
initiatives. 
 
One key consequence is that the mayor or the president of a territorial council 
becomes inside his territorial jurisdiction a much stronger actor than before and 
even than the prefect and the State representatives. This undisputed leader 
clearly stands now as the common denominator between multiple and weakened 
state units that are unable to coordinate their acts by themselves. His action 
platform and his power stakes shape a cognitive framework each of them does 
appropriate and all share.  
 
The surprise is that nevertheless the State territorial role is still valued and 
desired by local politicians. While state field agencies have lost their former 
hegemony, they still matter for local politicians. One reason is that stronger local 
authorities use weaker bureaucrats for strategic purposes of their own.  State 
field agencies offer access to decision-makers. Local and regional politicians use 
their managers as intermediaries, brokers and advocates to get some problems 
handled and some requests satisfied when third parties are influential in 
decision-making. State agencies supply non-partisan mediation. Their 
representatives are facilitators of local policy-making. Local administrators take 
advantage of the fact that state bureaucrats, while rather sensitive to territorial 
specificities, do not belong to the sphere of politics. Some prestige is linked to 
their status. Their careers are quite immune from outside influences. Mayors 
who are members of a same syndicate in charge of local development favor the 
intervention of a engineer of the ministry of Public Works to run their joint 
venture. Technical criteria and advice certified by state administrators are 
considered as a shelter against patronage and discretionary power. A collateral 
effect of state mediation is that some convergence is ensured between policy 
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areas in neighboring jurisdictions. Similar issues are put on the agendas. 
Identical choice criteria are enacted. State agents share a common educational 
and cognitive background. In many cases communes or regions adopt action 
frameworks that are designed by state administrations and benchmarked through 
cross-regulation. 
    
To get the prefect involved in municipal affairs or to receive some help from a 
State engineer allows the mayor not to become too exclusively dependent from 
the president of the general council and the bureaucracy he heads. The mayor 
avoids for instance the département or the region to become too powerful, to 
dictate its own terms. State local presence and intervention guarantees that 
public affairs as markets remain oligopolistic.  State representatives offer an 
alternative channel and rationale to political agents and partisan intermediaries. 
The mayor has not to pay a price to more powerful local politicians. Being 
dependent from the good will of a bureaucrat keeps politics out of the picture. 
State public agencies lower open wild competition between local authorities. 
Their presence prevents the weakest to become prisoners of the strongest. 
 
Accumulation of political mandates 
 
Presidential and mayoral centralization simplifies government inside each sub-
national authority at the micro level.  Nevertheless tens of thousands 
autonomous bodies and territories combined with the absence of hierarchical 
subordination links between them does not help some form of coordination and 
integration.  
 
A major constitutive process operates at a meso level. Six to seven hundred 
elected officials – sometimes called grands notables or grands élus – supply 
integration capacity between separate geo-institutional levels and across 
partitioned territories. Cumulating two or more electoral mandates is the way for 
a local administrator and politician to join such a very influential and exclusive 
club. 
 
French laws allow the same person to exert at the same time more than one 
electoral mandate. A municipal council member may also be a regional council 
member and a national senator in Paris, or a member of the European parliament 
in Strasbourg. Law puts some modest restrictions to accumulating 
national/European and local mandates. For instance it is not allowed to be a 
president of the regional and a president of a general council. An extensive use 
is made of elected local mandate accumulation. Around two thirds of the 
members of general councils also act as local mayors, not counting those who 
are mere municipal council members.  
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Top positions are concentrated in a few hands. National as well as European 
electoral mandates are linked with sub-national electoral mandates. The 
polarization of authority is also occurring between regional mandates and sub-
regional mandates such as municipal offices. Accumulation rate is even more 
impressive when mandates in sub-national authorities not directly elected by the 
population such as urban communities and communes of communes are taken 
into account and added to the portfolio.  
 
A Matthew effect is at work. Top mandates go to powerful politicians. To be a 
mayor of a large city or a president of a regional council increases the 
probability of simultaneously being a member of the national parliament. A 
member of the general council is more likely to be the mayor of the most 
populated commune of his district than a mere member of a municipal council 
of a small village in the same district. Citizens give a premium to accumulation. 
A candidate already holding another elected office has two to three times more 
chances to be elected by them than a competitor who is not. About half of the 
presidents of general councils and three quarters of the presidents of regional 
councils also sit on the benches of the national Parliament. 
 
Multiple mandate positions are rather safe jobs. Influence derived from 
accumulation amounts to more than the sum of the single mandates. The key 
reason is that their holder can control in one pair of hands different resources 
and be at the same time present at several levels of government, from Paris 
down to the commune, know-how, information and networks linked to one role 
being connected with those linked to the other roles.  
 
Despite low turnover and some patronage, accumulation is more an opportunity 
than a liability. Good reasons explain why voters do not jeopardize 
accumulation. It provides them with opportunities.  Citizens have a direct 
channel of access to Paris and central agencies: their mayor, who happens also 
to be a senator. Even mayors of surrounding communes may find helpful to 
support their colleague who, on top of mayor and senator, also is a member of 
the regional council. The bottom expects the grand élu to be a by-passer, a 
broker, an advocate of local causes at the top. 
 
As state agents do, grands élus provide alternative channels of mediation. But 
they are much more effective and powerful. No accumulation of mandates exists 
inside state hierarchies. A prefect cannot at the same time be his own 
subordinate and his own superior. A senator who also is mayor is not prisoner of 
hierarchies. Through him local inhabitants benefit from a very short circuit to 
get access to Paris while there may be at least two when not three anonymous 
intermediaries or levels inside the state administrative circuits. The fact that 
grands élus preside one if not two sub-national councils gives them a second 
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advantage. They control more resources and coordinate wider policy domains, 
and are not prisoners of silos. A third difference is linked to democratic 
legitimacy. State agents are not elected.   
 
Multiple mandate holders exert more power and influence than state agencies. 
At the same time they do not try to keep state agencies out of the game. They 
also govern in a centralized and personalized manner that is identical to the 
leadership style adopted by single mandate elected official. But they do it with 
even more strength.  They divide and rule. They are policy integrators. They 
frame mid-term horizons. They induce coordination in action between multiple 
actors, private and public. To pile up multiple hats on the same head becomes a 
collective solution in a world that is institutionally differentiated and politically 
scattered as the French scene is. To some extent a grand élu acts as an 
institutional facilitator. 
 
The accumulation process gives birth to a specific style of policy-making. While 
grands élus show muscles to impose their own preferences and reward their 
friends, they are keen not to punish their enemies too much. Territorial justice is 
a criterion that often overcomes partisan loyalties. Everybody should be entitled 
to a fair minimal share of the public pie. Communes run by opposition parties 
may even get a better treatment from the grand élu chairing the general council 
than communes run by friends of his own electoral majority (Gilbert and 
Thoenig 1997).  89 % of regional funds are allocated without any opposition and 
even any debate among political majorities and minorities inside the council 
(Gilbert and Thoenig 1999b). Political majorities get constructed and 
deconstructed according to criteria that do not just fit ideological cleavages and 
partisan coalitions.  
 
 
POWER BASES AND CONSERVATIVE AGENDAS  
 
Ideological debates about comprehensive redesigns in the field of territorial 
government have been quite shy since the early 1990s. Politicians do not rank its 
reform as a top priority issue in their electoral platforms.  Unlike Great Britain 
and Italy, for instance, French political leaders, left and right, seem to be quite 
cautious when not agnostic. So-called ‘New’ approaches dealing with public 
management, centralism or localism, are considered with skepticism for 
managerial purposes and inappropriate for political reasons.  
 
Modernization of territorial politics and policy making nevertheless keeps been 
fueled by a stream of initiatives and reforms taken at all levels. About 70 
relevant new laws or decrees have been issued by the State in the last 10 years. 
Most if not all of them are favoring incremental change. The sub-national 
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system evolves and is driven by adjustments as if a kind of blue-print would 
exist that would set limits to how far changes could occur or could be acceptable 
to the polity. A kind of implicit action agenda exists.  To understand its 
existence and its content, one has to recall the fact that there is no explicit legal 
definition of the domains of territorial affairs the State administration is in 
charge of. 
 
Agenda setting and political muscles are mainly in the hands of elected 
politicians whose feet are locally embedded and whose hands are nationally 
active. Ratios of mandate accumulation have remained quite constant in the last 
16 years (6 different legislatures and 5 changes of parliamentary majority). 
Around 90% of the members of the Parliament simultaneously hold one when 
not two elected mandates in sub-national authorities. About half of the senators 
are also busy as mayors.  An average of a third of the deputies hold two other 
local mandates. Even ministers of the Prime Minister cabinet may keep local 
mandates, and many do. 
 
To some extent the most powerful political party in France is neither the party of 
the President of the Republic nor the opposition party. This social configuration 
regroups in an informal manner most of such grands élus, a ‘party’ in which 
right and left wing politicians are equals and colleagues. It benefits from key 
influence in one specific policy domain: territorial government. The 
accumulation of mandates makes the blending when not the confusion between 
local and national agendas, between State offices and sub-national offices, 
constraining. State elites care about national and local affairs at the same time. 
The national political class is made of influent local administrators, and vice-
versa. 
 
Quite powerful associations are headed by grands élus who happen also to be 
key parliamentary legislators. The most established one is the national 
association of mayors. Described as the most powerful but invisible political 
lobby in national local politics (Le Lidec 2001), it gathers around 85% of the 
36.000 mayors. Other associations mobilize the activism of elected politicians 
according to their mandates: presidents of the regional councils, presidents of 
general councils, mayors of middle size cities or presidents of agglomeration 
councils. Because party cleavages may differ or their mutual interests may 
sometime clash, as a consequence of increased sub-national institutional 
differentiation, grands élus experience some difficulty to propose reform options 
that are consensual among their local constituency. This is specially the case for 
the senators who are elected not by the population but by local ‘colleagues’ such 
as the mayors and the general council members. The best they can do is to stand 
against any reform initiative that may basically jeopardize the current system, 
for instance that may merge communes or suppress the département.  Inside 
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their own political party they fight reform platforms. They also deter 
governmental initiatives and kill legislative proposals that would destabilize the 
current situation. They also deter governmental initiatives and kill legislative 
proposals that would destabilize the current situation. These “guardians of local 
autonomy” share an implicit non-partisan common agenda. Five basic properties 
of the system are to be safeguarded. Any reform that would modify them should 
be killed such as:  
 
Establishing a formal subordination between sub-national authorities, one level 
having constitutive rights on another level 
Forbidding the accumulation of mandates between all levels  
Putting an end to centralization of power in the hands of the president of the 
council, which means more checks and balances, and more decentralization 
from elected bodies to the population 
Abolishing one of the three main sub-national levels (region, département, 
commune)  
Lowering the influence of the State machinery and putting an end to its 
operational role in sub-national government. 
 
For instance, socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin seriously considered in 
1999-2000 to end any accumulation of electoral mandates of any kind. Polls 
suggested strong support public opinion. But he faced open blackmailing inside 
his own party in terms of sponsorship of his candidacy for the upcoming 
presidential election.  The law he had prepared to enforce more democratic 
participation by the people was never submitted to the parliament.  
 
While quite massive policy domains and authority have been transferred from 
the State to sub-national institutions between 1981 and 2004, no relevant 
transfer of power has ever been considered from the local politicians to the 
population. The majority of right as well as left politicians do not support the 
idea to expand checks and balances in local government– for instance to get the 
executive body or the mayor directly elected as such by the citizens, and apart 
from the council members election. Free referenda, initiatives by the population, 
and any other sort of modern form of citizen participation are considered as 
threatening perspectives to representative democracy, sometimes labeled as 
‘non-republican’ principles  
 
Twice in the recent years State decentralization policies have reinforced 
institutional differentiation and autonomy between sub-national levels. Prime 
Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin had to leave aside any attempt to create some 
subordination relationships of the département to the region or of the commune 
to the département. The first decentralization operated in the early 1980s faced 
no resistance for two reasons. It did not jeopardize the basic properties. The 
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socialist government managed it in an authoritarian way during its first hundred 
days, leaving no voice and option to the Parliament and local resistance. In 2002 
and 2003 the process turned into a nightmare for the center-right government He 
had made extensive consultation of local elites prior to the final draft of a law 
and its discussion by the Parliament. Lacking support from President Chirac, the 
Prime Minister had to bargain major compromises to get most of the grands élus 
belonging to his own parliamentary majority approve his law. Any attempt to 
subordinate in a way or another the département to the region or the commune 
to the département had to be dropped.  
 
To keep both the region and the département, to add local functional institutions 
without massively decreasing the number of the communes, to ask the State to 
fund cities and villages that are fiscally poor, not to decentralize policy domains 
where budget cuts would be needed, are options that have consequences and 
costs. Facing increasingly differentiated institutional interests – regions, 
départements, communes of agglomeration, cities, etc.- the political class is 
unable to suggest in a consensual way which level should be favored and which 
one should be suppressed. It externalizes the political responsibility to the 
government in Paris and the financial costs to the State ministry of Budget, 
which means the national taxpayers (Gilbert and Guengant 2002). Local 
authorities such as communes and general councils prefer by far the State than 
the region or themselves to equalize fiscal revenues. And the State is trapped by 
and in local interests. Grants to local and regional authorities represent the major 
expense item of the State after the public debt. Their total amount is currently 
increasing by 5% each year.  
 
Territorial government may be close to fiscal collapse, but public debates are 
still difficult to launch: who outside the inner circle of grands élus is legitimate 
to express a political voice and able to suggest alternatives to a system that is so 
complicate? The policy agenda setting is out of reach of public opinion. The 
lack of central discretionary authority on state-local financial relationships is just 
one facet of a much broader picture. National steering of sub-national public 
affairs is poorly effective for State political and bureaucratic officials, whether 
prefects or heads of national ministries. The initiative taken by surprise by 
President Mitterrand and his minister of Interior in 1981 was the exception to 
the rule. The Presidency of the Republic itself is if not weaker at least more 
prudent than one would expect from a political regime as the French State seems 
to be on paper (Hayward and Wright 2002). The State administrative elites are 
like Gulliver: their feet are trapped in a local system that is difficult to clarify, 
simplify and make less costly, either by more localism or by new centralism. 
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AFTERWORD 
 
While the decentralization policy launched by François Mitterrand in the first 
part of the 1980s did not generate strong resistance, territorial administration 
reform has become a very controversial political issue in the last years. 
The 2007 collapse of the banking system and the collateral economic crisis have 
put heavy pressures on the financial resources available to the French 
government. The debt of the State has reached levels - a deficit slightly above 
8% and a debt of 80% of the GDP - that are not fitting the stability criteria 
defined by the Maastricht treaty.  
Despite a rather important package of policy domains transferred to them by the 
State since the mid-1908s, local authorities do not experience similar budgetary 
constraints and financial deficits. Between 1996 and 2007, their expenses 
increased annually by 5,35%, as compared with an average increase of 3,35% of 
the State budget.  More than communes and départements, regions were and still 
are financially at ease in terms of revenues and resources1. They kept increasing 
their taxes.  
Elected as President of the Republic in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy promised not to 
increase national taxes when not to decrease fiscal pressure. Regions and 
departments should in his view join the national effort of cost cutting and stop 
acting as free riders. Economies of scale should become a key principle guiding 
public administration reform nationally and locally. Policy domains – culture,  
economic development, etc - should be funded by one local authority only, and 
not any longer by two when not by three different levels. Regional and 
departmental councils should cut the monies allocated to their running costs, 
stop building less fancy building for their staff, and pay less their elected 
officials as well as their administrative staffs.  
In March 2009 a report commissioned by Nicolas Sarkozy to the former Prime 
minister Edouard Balladur suggested a so-called simplification of the territorial 
administration system that could also be politically acceptable. Communes 
would not be merged. Départements and regions would remain distinctive 
bodies. Nevertheless all the members of the political council running a 
département would also sit on the benches of the regional council. In other terms 
the latter body would be composed by the sum of the elected officials belonging 
to the councils of the départements of a region. These politicians would 
therefore cumulate two mandates and be elected by the same voters the same 
day. This would cut by half the total numbers of councilmen in regions and 
départements. This would also imply the creation of new specific electoral 
districts, namely the cantons. 
This sophisticated blueprint has not been easy to be understood by a rather 
indifferent public opinion. But it generated a lot of turbulence inside the ranks 
                                                
1 In 2007 the regions spent 117% more money than in 1996, while the communes had less room for manoeuvre - 
in increase of 33,4% only. 
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and files of the local and national political class. Open hostility has been 
expressed both by the left parties and by the centre-right majority of the Senate. 
Sarkozy’s ambition became challenged by most of the leaders as well as by 
thousands of local politicians who had been his strongest supporters up to now.  
On top of it, several presidents of départements, socialists as well as moderates, 
openly started to challenge the State and to ask courts to oblige Paris to pay its 
share of the policy domains it should by law contribute to.  The State not paying 
its debts, not holding its promises or transferring more and more expenses to the 
local budgets, are nowadays suspicions openly expressed. Cumulards2 rebelling 
is a premiere in contemporary France.    
Another recurrent issue, the abolition of the possibility for one person to 
cumulate more two elected mandates or more, is still handled with care if not 
reluctance by political parties. Centre and centre-right wing politicians do not 
want to take additional risks after their defeat at the regional elections in March 
20103.  While abolition is rather supported by public opinion according to polls, 
the ecologists are the only party to explicitly insert it in their electoral platform. 
The members of the socialist party too have endorsed abolition via an internal 
referendum. But many leaders of the party, at least those who at the same time 
control the most powerful local federations, are mayors of important cities and 
also members of the Parliament in Paris, keep expressing their hostility to this 
idea, arguing that abolition would jeopardize the possibility of the socialists to 
win the majority at the 2011 elections for the Senate, given the fact that rural 
districts, traditionally rather centre-right oriented, may fear a reduction of their 
influence in Paris if electing non-cumulating politicians. While public opinion 
expresses a lack of overall confidence in the political class, the cumulard being a 
symbol of such a disdain, voters still continue to favour a candidate who already 
has another mandate to a candidate who has none. Local pragmatism is at work. 
In other words, the model presented in the 2005 paper seems quite robust and 
able to predict the complex ways politics and policy dynamics interfere and 
interact in the field of territorial administration in France, which issues make it 
to the political agenda, which trade-offs the content of reforms have to consider, 
how policies shall be implemented.  
The French case is not just another exotic story. For social sciences dealing with 
public administration, it offers a heuristic opportunity to study public affairs as a 
systemic phenomenon, and to address change and stability issues. To define 
France in terms of a highly path dependent case should not deter analysis from 
exploring more in depth the logics and stakeholders at work, and the solutions 
they improvise to satisfice their vested interests while not jeopardizing public 
interest too much.  
                                                
2 This pejorative expression defines political officials who cumulate two or more mandates, national, regional, 
communal or at the level of the département. 
3 Since March 2010 ll regional councils except one –Alsace- are governed by a left-oriented coalition. The 
socialist party and its allies also govern a majority of the  general councils in charge of the departments.  
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Appendix 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
Main levels: 
 
- communes                                            36.676                 
- ‘départements’                                          100 
- regions                                                      22 
 
Inter-communal authorities (a selection): 
 
- urban communities                               14   (as of 1.1.2002) 
- communities of communes                2.033   (id.) 
- agglomeration communities                  120   (id.) 
- ‘syndicats mixtes’                             1.700    (est.) 
- ‘syndicats à vocation multiple’           1.900   (est.) 
- ‘syndicats  à vocation unique’           12.500   (est.) 
 
 
 
 
 Main sub-national public institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4/11/11  31    31   
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The president/mayor  as  integrator of the local polity 
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